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As a researcher who reads journal articles,
a journal reviewer, and a journal editor, I
have lost track of the countless times I have
encountered a particular type of scenario.
An author obtains a statistically significant
finding, points out that a particular the-
ory fails to predict that finding, and argues
that therefore the finding disconfirms the
theory. But as I recently pointed out to a
doubtless disappointed author inmy rejec-
tion letter, this argument can be less strong
than it appears at first blush. To see why,
it is important to distinguish between two
possibilities.
The first possibility is that the the-
ory contains one or more propositions
that, combined with reasonable auxiliary
assumptions, really does lead to a par-
ticular prediction, whether of a result in
a particular direction or a null effect. In
that case, the failure of the prediction to
materialize in the data really does consti-
tute a problem for the theory. But there
is a second possibility that often occurs.
Specifically, a theory does not contain
any propositions that lead to a prediction
in the author’s experimental paradigm.
Rather the author’s paradigm includes fac-
tors that are not mentioned in the the-
ory. So the theory does not predict a null
(or other) effect at all. Rather, the theory
fails to make any prediction, whatsoever,
with respect to the author’s experimen-
tal paradigm. Naturally, when factors that
are not included in the theory, but are
included in the new paradigm, cause a sta-
tistically significant effect to occur, it is
true that the theory “cannot account for
the data.” But this is very different from
saying that the data “are a problem” for the
theory. The data are not a problem for the
theory because the data are irrelevant to
the theory. Unfortunately, authors, review-
ers, and readers tend to interpret “cannot
account for the data” as equivalent to “are
a problem for the theory.” And so the data
take on an unjustified level of importance.
It sometimes happens that a researcher
feels that a theory ought to make a predic-
tion in the experimental paradigm being
used. But that the researcher feels this way
does not make it so. Even if the researcher
could make a convincing case that the the-
ory ought to have included the researcher’s
variables, it would not be the finding itself
that would militate against the theory but
rather the argument that the theory failed
to include everything that it should have
included.
To avoid directly criticizing the guilty,
let me make up an example involving the
old frustration-aggression hypothesis that
having a goal blocked causes frustration
and the frustration causes aggression (see
Berkowitz, 1989 for a review). Suppose a
researcher uses an experimental paradigm
where participants are bribed with money
to be aggressive in the experimental
condition but are not bribed in the con-
trol condition. The researcher observes
more aggression in the experimental con-
dition than in the control condition,
and concludes the following: First, the
frustration-aggression hypothesis fails
to predict the effect. Second, because
the effect happened, the frustration-
aggression hypothesis is disconfirmed. The
fallacy is that the frustration-aggression
hypothesis does not predict a null effect,
rather it fails to make any prediction
whatsoever, and these are not the same
thing. The reason the hypothesis does not
make any prediction is because it con-
cerns the blocking of goals whereas the
experiment concerns the entirely differ-
ent matter of financial bribery. Thus, the
data do not disconfirm the frustration-
aggression hypothesis; rather, the data
are irrelevant to the hypothesis. In addi-
tion, that the researcher might feel like the
frustration-aggression hypothesis should
have included bribery does not mean that
the finding is a problem for frustration-
aggression hypothesis, though if the
researcher were able to make a convinc-
ing argument about why the hypothesis
should have included bribery, the argu-
ment (rather than the finding) might be
problematic.
Why do psychology researchers so often
commit this fallacy? My guess is that it
stems partly from the dominance of the
null hypothesis significance testing proce-
dure (NHSTP). Although the NHSTP has
been argued to be invalid (e.g., Trafimow,
2003), that is not my point here. My point
here is that the NHSTP puts a premium
on statistically significant effects. If a sig-
nificant effect is obtained, the NHSTP
allows the researcher to conclude that the
null hypothesis of no difference is wrong,
and this wrongness is interpreted as evi-
dence in support of the author’s hypoth-
esis. In contrast, if the obtained effect
is not statistically significant, the NHSTP
does not allow the researcher to draw
any conclusion other than the extremely
weak one that he or she failed to reject
the null hypothesis. This extremely weak
conclusion does not convincingly discon-
firm or support any substantive hypothe-
sis. Consequently, psychology researchers
are trained to try for statistically significant
effects. But psychology researchers also
are trained to try for theoretically mean-
ingful effects. The easy way to combine
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these two considerations is to test one’s
theory against an alternative theory that
does not make a prediction with respect to
the researcher’s paradigm, obtain a statis-
tically significant effect, and interpret the
data as disconfirming the alternative the-
ory and supporting one’s own theory. Of
course, as I already have demonstrated,
this sort of reasoning constitutes a fal-
lacy because not making a prediction is
not the same thing as predicting a null
effect.
If psychology researchers somehow
could have their minds wiped of their
psychology training, the fallacy might be
more obvious to them and less likely to
be committed. But because of the necessity
in our field to combine the rejection
of the null hypothesis with the draw-
ing of theoretically meaningful conclu-
sions to publish manuscripts, the fallacy
has become so ingrained as to become
largely implicit and automatic. My goal is
to make the fallacy explicit and to focus
attention on it, so that it is not propagated
into the next generation of psychology
research.
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